Shocks to the …nancial sector led credit spreads to widen to unprecedented levels in many markets during the 2007-2008 …nancial crisis. The rise in spreads attracted attention because it could signal a disruption in …nancial markets, which has been widely linked to an increased burden on non-…nancial …rms. This paper disentangles the relative contributions of credit and liquidity risk in explaining the widening of commercial paper spreads. In doing so, we …nd that liquidity risk was isolated to the …nancial sector throughout the …rst two major shocks to the system (August 2007 and March 2008). Indeed, controlling for credit risk, non-…nancial corporations saw little or no change in the cost of funding during this time period. After the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, for the …rst time, liquidity problems in the commercial paper market spilled out of the …nancial sector into the spreads of low credit quality non…nancial …rms. This e¤ect had a disproportionately larger impact on those low credit-quality non-…nancial …rms that placed paper exclusively through …nancial sector dealers. High credit quality …rms remained una¤ected throughout. Our interpretation of the results is that markets were able to di¤erentiate not only between safe and imperiled …rms in the midst of the crisis, but also to isolate where liquidity e¤ects were most likely to be salient.
Introduction
Commercial paper spreads widened to unprecedented levels in many …nancial markets during the 2007-2008 …nancial crisis. For example, according to data from the Federal Reserve, the spread over the fed funds rate paid by A2/P2-rated non-…nancial …rm to issue overnight commercial paper increased from 60 to 400 basis points during the week following the Lehman Brothers'bankruptcy.
The rise in spreads attracted a great deal of attention, because disruptions in …nancial markets are widely believed to tighten credit conditions for non-…nancial …rms.
Although this unprecedented widening of spreads has been extensively documented, there is little consensus on its contributing factors. Our paper has two core aims. First, we provide a set of empirical results that contribute to the discussion on the relative importance of credit risk and the liquidity risk of very short-term commercial paper during the …nancial crisis. Second, we use these empirical results to shed light on the role of …nancial intermediaries in transmitting …nancial shocks to the real economy. To accomplish the …rst objective, we study changes in spreads around the time period of three large shocks to the …nancial system: investors'realization of the large scope For each of the three events, we distinguish between (a) …nancial and non-…nancial issuers, (b) paper placed through a dealer and paper placed directly to the market, and (c) by issuer credit rating. With these three dimensions, we are able to precisely evaluate which set of …rms were impacted by the shocks that hit the …nancial sector and which were relatively unscathed. Our criterion for the transmission from the …nancial sector will be the degree to which non-…nancial …rms saw …nancial sector shocks impact the liquidity component of their own borrowing rates.
Where we observe that changes in credit quality alone explain spread changes of non-…nancial …rms, even around a large event, we will make the claim that there is little transmission. 1 For our empirical work, we focus on unsecured commercial paper of 1-4 day maturity. Commercial paper is a signi…cant source of short-term debt …nancing for a wide range of …rms. This market provides …nancing to …nancial …rms and corporations typically for less than 3 months, and a significant fraction has a maturity of just a few days. Analyzing the credit spreads on the shortest-term corporate debt is of special interest, because it allows us to abstract from changes in the slope of the yield curve and term premia. Although one may argue that only liquidity risk matters for such short maturities, Covitz and Downing (2007) show that, even for very short-term spreads, credit risk is important in the commercial paper market. Another practical reason for using the shortest maturity paper is that issuance of longer duration commercial paper was most a¤ected during the …nancial crisis, and only the highest quality …rms were able to issue longer term paper. Therefore, issuer selection is less severe in the shortest maturity paper. The outstanding total commercial paper balance in July 2007 was $2.1 trillion, including $1.2 trillion of asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP). By the end of June 2009, the outstanding balance had dropped to $1.28 trillion, a collapse of about 40% of the market.
It is important to understand the relative scale of liquidity versus credit factors in interest rate spreads for various reasons. On the one hand, it is important for investors' portfolio allocation decisions. The increase in spreads may represent increased compensation demanded by risk-averse investors as the credit risk on the assets increases, or alternatively could represent the premium demanded to hold more illiquid assets, which would make those assets more attractive to long-term investors (Schwarz, 2009 ). On the other hand, understanding the relative signi…cance of credit and liquidity risk is important for designing e¢ cient policy responses to market disruptions. If liquidity is the primary problem, then the general consensus is that policy makers should direct 1 The degree of transmission has been widely debated. Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (2008) write that there was little evidence of impact on non-…nancial …rms in October of 2008. Cohen-Cole et al (2008) respond that evidence of transmission was indeed available at the time of the crisis. Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) point out that non-…nancial …rms held su¢ cient cash stock piles prior to the crisis to have paid o¤ existing debt, obviating the need for …nancing.
3 e¤orts to restoring market con…dence to make markets more liquid. 2 If credit risk is the main determinant of credit spread widening, then policy makers can either improve the solvency of the counterparties involved or allow the market to reallocate credit independently. In theory, in the absence of liquidity concerns, there is limited scope for intervention. In practice, the distinction between these two explanations is not clear-cut, since liquidity shortages may be a by-product of credit problems, and the solution is no longer as simple as restoring con…dence. As we shall see below, our results suggest that the transmission of liquidity shocks from …nancial intermediaries to some non-…nancial …rms may emerge from credit concerns.
We provide evidence in this paper that the spike in credit spreads in the short-term commercial paper market was a combination of a liquidity and credit crisis. More importantly we show that the liquidity risk was largely isolated to the …nancial sector throughout the …rst two major shocks to the system (August 2007 and March 2008). Indeed, controlling for credit risk, non-…nancial corporations saw little or no change in the cost of funding during this time period. Liquidity problems in the commercial paper market spilled out of the …nancial sector into the spreads of low credit quality non-…nancial …rms for the …rst time after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. This e¤ect had a disproportionately larger impact on those low credit-quality non-…nancial …rms that placed paper exclusively through …nancial sector dealers. Issuance cost of commercial paper of high credit-quality …rms remained una¤ected throughout. 3 Our interpretation of the results is that markets were able to di¤erentiate not only between safe and imperiled …rms in the midst of the crisis, but also to isolate where liquidity e¤ects were most likely to be salient. Non-…nancial …rms that were of good credit quality and / or had some direct access to capital markets were able to sidestep the liquidity shocks that hit the …nancial sector. In contrast, non-…nancial …rms with credit or potential credit exposure experienced sharply increased 2 See Allen, Carletti and Gale (2009) and Krishnamurthy (2010) for examples and literature review. 3 Our emphasis in on the immediately e¤ects of the …nancial shocks on the funding costs of …rms. As the recession continued, many parts of the economy were impacte by a myriad of factors. Our di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach that we discuss in detail below is designed to isolate the impact of the large shocks on commerical paper spreads. 4 credit risk sensitivity after August 2007, especially if they were using a dealer to place paper in the market.
Jointly, our …ndings highlight the manner in which the …nancial sector transmitted shocks to the large non-…nancial corporations that are the typical commercial paper users. For the …rst year following the initial shock in August 2007, almost no transmission occurred. However, once the largest shock hit in September 2008, the stress on the …nancial sector was su¢ cient that the spillover to the non-…nancial sector occurred, a¤ecting most the lower quality …rms and dealer users. This suggests that the transmission of the shocks from the …nancial sector to the real economy occurred through intermediated services to low credit quality …rms.
Our results show that the principal risk faced by …nancial …rms was the ability to rollover their short-term debt. Of course, in the medium run, many of the banks' holdings of bad debt may have led to credit problems as well, but, at the time of the strongest shocks to the market during the crisis, the critical problem for …nancial institutions appears to have been liquidity. Our results are in contrast with those of Afonso, Kovner and Schoar (2010), who document that counterparty risk played a much more important role than liquidity hoarding in the interbank market during the 2008 …nancial crisis. Their interpretation of the results is that lenders in the fed funds market were able to screen out the worst performing borrowers. Our results suggest that investors in the commercial paper market demanded a higher premium to invest in …nancial commercial paper due to increased liquidity risk, not credit risk. However, it is important to note that the di¤erence in results may be due to the fact that commercial paper and fed funds are di¤erent markets, and the …nancial …rms participating in each one may di¤er.
The …ndings in this paper have implications for the debate on the importance of the …nancial sector for the real economy. The continued economic sluggishness more than three years after the initial subprime shocks of August 2007 has repeatedly been attributed to the lack of debt …nancing 5 from the commercial banking sector. 4 As the crisis struck, the widespread interpretation of the stress in credit markets was that a lack of liquidity led to the inability for essentially all market participants to roll over obligations. Given that the initial …nancial shock was concentrated in the banking sector, one could expect that bank-dependent …rms would be most a¤ected by this shock.
On the other hand, non-…nancial corporations that issue commercial paper should be somewhat isolated from the shock in the banking system since these larger …rms have the ability to access capital markets. In this paper we present evidence on an often neglected link of the …nancial and non-…nancial sectors, which is that many non-…nancial commercial paper issuers use a dealer to place the paper into the market.
An extant literature and press reports have emphasized the crucial nature of the …nancial sector for promoting economic growth. Indeed, the work of Bernanke et al (1999) , as well as recent work by a range of others, 5 facilitated understanding of …nancial linkages to the real sector that were not possible within classical macroeconomic models. Empirical evidence for prior crises shows that bank distress is transmitted into the real economy. 6 Additionally, there is a growing literature on the empirical implications of the 2007-2008 …nancial crisis that suggest a real-economy link. 7 However, there are relatively few papers that seek to understand the nature, timing and size of 4 6 the transmission. 8 This paper contributes to this literature by disentagling the pathway for the spillover from the …nancial sector to the real economy using evidence from the commercial paper market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We proceed in section 2 to provide an overview of the commercial paper market, principally focusing on the unsecured segment of the market. In section 3, we describe our data in more detail and discuss our empirical strategy. Section 4 presents our main results and provides some important robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
Background on the Commercial Paper Market
Commercial paper is a form of borrowing with a …xed maturity, typically between 1 and 270 days.
The paper is issued by banks, large corporations, and special purpose vehicles to meet short-term …nancial obligations including operational needs such as payroll, or for the purchase of assets.
Commercial paper is viewed as an inexpensive funding option by banks and corporations alike.
Prior to the crisis, it was relatively simple for large corporations to access the commercial paper market, and regular funding could be obtained at rates lower than bank loans and without the fees associated with a guaranteed line of credit. However, many issuers maintain a line of credit to provide additional access to capital.
Commercial paper can broadly be classi…ed along a few dimensions. Among these are the presence of collateral, the type of issuing …rm and the issuance channel (see Hahn, 1998 , for a description of the commercial paper market). Our paper focuses principally on unsecured (uncollateralized) commercial paper issued across a range of channels. By evaluating unsecured paper, we are able to isolate the impact of the credit quality of the issuer from the role of liquidity shocks without explicit modeling of the underlying asset quality. That is, we can rely on credit quality estimates of the corporate commercial paper sponsor as a reasonable proxy for credit-worthiness. 8 A recent exception is Tong and Wei (2009).
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A comprehensive overview of the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) market and its operation during the crisis can be found in Covitz, Liang and Suarez (2009).
Within the commercial paper markets, we will look at the issuance of commercial paper across both …nancial and non-…nancial …rms. Non-…nancial and …nancial corporations alike used the commercial paper market as a highly liquid and readily accessible short-term funding. Anecdotally, these markets grew in popularity both because borrowing costs were somewhat lower than equivalent corporate loans and because commercial paper is, in general, junior to secured debt. The use of commercial paper by …nancial and non-…nancial …rms di¤ers substantially. Non-…nancial …rms typically use commercial paper to fund on-going cash ‡ow needs such as payroll and inventories.
As a result, interruption of access to these markets could lead to an inability to manage regular operations and cause layo¤s and supply disruptions, which could potentially lead to severe disruptions to the real economy. Financial …rms use commercial paper to manage short-term liquidity needs, including maturity mismatch in assets and liabilities, or in some cases to fund large portions of their balance sheet.
With respect to the methods of issuing paper, an issuer can either sell securities directly in the money markets or it can sell them to a dealer. The dealer subsequently sells the paper in the market. Dealers are typically large banks and bank holding companies, including the investment banks that existed prior to the …nancial crisis. The bene…t of direct issuance is the ability to receive the full market price for the securities. However, working through a dealer institution could facilitate issuance if the institution has strong distribution networks.
We will highlight this distinction throughout our empirical analysis. A buyer of corporate commercial paper from a dealer assumes the risk of corporate default during the term of the commercial paper as well as the counterparty risk of the dealer during the settlement time period between purchase …nal settlements. This risk prior to the crisis was negligible, but during the crisis it became large. As a result, issuers that relied on dealers faced the possibility that liquidity 8 concerns at the dealer banks would impact the spreads on their own issuances. Below, we provide empirical support for this link.
Data
Our initial dataset includes all 91,589 primary market issues in the unsecured commercial paper Corporation (DTCC), the agent that electronically clears and settles directly-and dealer-placed commercial paper. The issues in the sample are discount instruments paying face value at maturity.
For each transaction, DTCC provides the identity and industry of the issuer, the face and settlement values of the transaction, and the maturity of the security. Using this information, we calculate yields on new paper based on the assumption of a 360-day year.
We also obtain from DTCC a separate weekly …le that contains program level information on the maturity distribution of outstanding paper. Further, we supplement the DTCC data with information on program type, credit ratings, liquidity features, and sponsor identity from various reports from Moody's Investors Service.
We have four key variables for our study:
Overnight CP spread
We use the spread over the fed funds rate for commercial paper maturing in 1-4 days. We choose the shortest term commercial paper to ensure that we can evaluate the trade-o¤ between liquidity and credit risk without concern for yield curve impacts, duration or other issues. Another practical reason for using the shortest maturity paper is that issuance of longer dated commercial paper was most a¤ected during the …nancial crisis, and only the very high quality …rms were able to issue longer term paper. Therefore, issuer selection is least severe for the shortest maturity paper.
CDS Spread
We supplement data on commercial paper transactions with measures of credit and liquidity risk. For our credit risk measure, we obtain 5-year CDS spreads for each commercial paper issuer from Markit Partners. A CDS spread is a fraction of the CDS contract notional paid from the buyer to the seller in return for credit protection on debt obligations, in the case where the issuer defaults. For each day, we average CDS spreads of senior unsecured debt across four primary types. 9 CDS spreads are generally regarded as real-time market-based measures of credit risk. While there is some evidence that they contain a liquidity component, its importance appears to be small in magnitude (Tang and Yan (2007) , Lin, Liu and Wu (2009)).
Fraction of paper maturing in following week
For our liquidity measure, we calculate the fraction of total liabilities maturing in the upcoming week using information provided by DTCC. This measure provides a proxy for the issuer's need for liquidity in the short run that re ‡ects the maturity of its liability in the absence of credit quality concerns.
Fraction of dealer-placed paper.
To account for the role of dealer intermediation in this market, we calculate the percentage of each program's issuances that is placed through a dealer. Later in the paper, we will subdivide the sample to evaluate the di¤erence between programs that exclusively place their paper through dealers and those that directly sell at least some of their own paper. Table 1 summarizes our dataset by subperiod. The …rst four columns show summary statistics for the full sample period, January 2007 to December 2008. The subsequent columns show summary statistics for commercial paper issuances for the three subperiods of our analysis: January to 9 The four classes are the standard International Swap and Derivatives Association (ISDA) classi…cations. Class 1 is "No Restructuring": This option excludes restructuring altogether from the contract, eliminating the possibility that the protection seller su¤ers a "soft" credit event that does not necessarily result in losses to the protection buyer. Class 2 are "Full restructuring" contracts. These allow the protection buyer to deliver bonds based on any debt restructuring. Classes 3 and 4 are "Modi…ed Restructuring" and "Modi…ed Modi…ed Restructuring" contracts. These are full restructuring contracts that limit the bonds that can be delivered to <30 months and <60 months respectively. . Each panel provides summary information for the core four variables used in the study plus two additional liquidity measures that we will address below. We report the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum for each variable for each time period. We also report the number of commercial programs that appear in each sample, as well as the number of observations (issuances) in each case.
Empirical Strategy and Results
The aim of this paper is to disentangle the relative contributions of credit risk and liquidity risk in the widening of unsecured commercial paper spreads of maturity 1 to 4 days during three major Finally, we want to investigate whether issuers in the …nancial sector were impacted di¤erently than those outside of it. Our analysis of the commercial paper using a combination of these criteria enables us to shed some light on the following general questions:
1. Was the …nancial crisis a liquidity or credit event?
2. Does this distinction help us understand the transmission channel from the …nancial to the real economy?
3. Was the market able to distinguish between imperiled companies and safe ones?
We show in Figure 1 We then subdivide the sample of commercial paper issuance along the …nancial/non-…nancial and dealer/direct dimensions. These steps allow us to use a di¤erence-in-di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach along three axes:
Financial vs non-…nancial …rms. This distinction permits us to analyze the di¤erential impacts of the crisis on the …nancial and real economies.
Pre-shock vs post-shock. With this approach, we are able to determine the impact of the shock on the indicated sub-sections of the economy for each of the three shocks mentioned.
Dealer placed vs direct issuance. By looking at dealer placement, we can shed additional light on the role of intermediation functions on the impact of the crisis.
At the end of the paper, we will complement the analysis by looking more deeply at the highest credit quality …rms.
Results
We begin with an exploration of the impact of three …nancial crisis events on CP spreads. In particular, we look at the contribution of our liquidity and credit proxies as each of the crisis events hit the markets. We can begin with a regression of spreads on two controls independent of event dummies.
for all companies i in time t. The variable spread it is the 1 day commercial paper spread. credit 1 it is our …rst credit variable, average 5-yr CDS, and liquidity 1 it is our …rst liquidity proxy: fraction of outstanding commercial paper due in the upcoming week. We also include program dummies, i , thereby adding …xed e¤ects to the model.
We interpret a positive liquidity coe¢ cient as representing heightened sensitivity to short-term funding needs. A positive coe¢ cient on the credit variable suggests increased credit risk premia. Table 2 shows the results of this speci…cation. We can see in the top two rows and the …rst three columns that a …rst order impact of the crisis was to increase spreads due to both credit and 13 liquidity. These e¤ects are present, large and strong in nearly all speci…cations.
[Insert T able 2 here] Table 2 also includes issuer and date-level …xed e¤ects at the …rm level and marks whether the regressions have been estimated with heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. In subsequent tables, we will use only the speci…cations that have issuer …xed e¤ects and robust standard errors.
Issuer …xed e¤ects are important to controlling for idiosyncratic di¤erences across programs. We don't include date …xed e¤ects to avoid problems of collinearity, as our spread information is also at a day level. Additional results including these other possibilities are available on request.
Baseline
We can now turn to our primary speci…cation. As mentioned, we include dummies for each of the three events. The interaction of the dummies for the stress time periods with the credit and liquidity variables provides the basis for inference.
where T D k t is a dummy coded 1 during the time period after the event k and zero otherwise. The variables T D k CR it and T D k LIQ it are the interactions between T D k t and the relevant credit and liquidity variables de…ned above. For the speci…cations we showed in Table 2 , as well as in future tables, we will code the dummy as 1 for the one-month period after the event in question. Our speci…cations will include two months of data for each event, one month prior and one month post event. [Insert T able 3 here]
Of particular note in table 3 is that both the credit and liquidity proxies are strongly positive and signi…cant in the …rst two event time periods. The liquidity variable is strongly signi…cant and positive in Lehman event time period. This result is consistent with interpretations of the crisis that found that liquidity was at a large premium and that risk premia increased sharply. By the time we reach the Lehman crisis, the markets have become strongly attuned to liquidity concerns, and the coe¢ cients suggest that this was the primary e¤ect.
We will expand the analysis in equation 2 by analyzing in the three ways described below with the goal of answering our primary question.
The Financial Sector
We can move now to an analysis of the impact of the three crisis events on spreads across types of issuers. As was widely publicized, the crisis was originally in the …nancial sector itself. As a result, a key method to determining whether the liquidity shocks were generalized is to observe di¤erences in spread changes across …nancial and non-…nancial …rms.
This di¤erence is important for understanding the role of the …nancial …rms in impacting the real economy. Referring to Figure 1 again, we can illustrate a basic interpretation of coe¢ cient combinations across …nancial and non-…nancial …rms. In addition to interpreting the simple liquidity and credit coe¢ cients, the schematic infers from the combination of coe¢ cients the possible interaction between the two sectors. Speci…cally, sets of positive coe¢ cients for all combinations implies, as in table 3, that the economy faced generalized distress. However, mixed sets of coe¢ cient imply di¤erential responses to the crisis.
We extend equation 2 above by estimating the speci…cations on the subsamples of the …nancial sector and the non-…nancial sector commercial paper programs. The two sets of results are shown in table 4. We have included the full sample results as well for comparability. As in the previous tables, we show the results for each of the three events separately, arranged in chronological order.
[Insert T able 4 here]
In table 4 we observe a number of notable features. First, the generalized shocks that appeared in table 3 are signi…cantly di¤erentiated across the sectors. In some of the events, one of the two variables is insigni…cant for one of the two groups. Even before discussion of the nature of the distinction, this implies that the impact of the crisis was distinct across sectors; that is, the market was able to distinguish the impact of the crisis with some degree of precision across sectors -even during the Lehman event. This is in sharp contrast to the notion that the market as a whole froze.
Second, the pattern of di¤erentiation provides evidence that the …nancial sector faced principally a liquidity shock, and the non-…nancial sector principally a credit shock. We have shaded the coe¢ cients that indicate this pattern in table 4. Notice that in each of the three events, the non…nancial sector saw a signi…cant credit shock. Indeed, the sector only faced a liquidity shock at the Lehman bankruptcy event. Below we will provide some additional detail on this component to show that only a portion of the non-…nancial sector saw this shock. On the other hand, the …nancial sector saw a liquidity shock in all three and only saw a credit e¤ect during the Bear Stearns collapse.
We take the fact that these simple proxies are able to di¤erentiate the e¤ect during such enormous disruption as strong evidence that the market was able to di¤erentiate …rms in purchasing commercial paper. That is, our proxies are a single measure of …rm liquidity needs and credit quality. While we cannot be certain of investor behavior, one might hope that investors would use more than a CDS spread and the fraction of maturing paper to make lending decisions. If so, we would expect to see even greater levels of di¤erentiation.
The distinctions that we observe imply that the generalized disruption was more orderly than previously thought. Indeed, notice that this interpretation is distinct from a ‡ight-to-quality, panic scenario. Rather, it re ‡ects a market that was able to use available information to make reasonable lending decisions even in the midst of one of the largest …nancial disruptions in history.
Additionally, the pattern facilitates understanding of the role of the …nancial sector in the real economy. During normal times, the …nancial sector provides intermediation services and access to funding for real-economy …rms. Our results suggest that the shocks faced during this large crisis led to dramatically increased liquidity premia at …nancial …rms, but had little direct liquidity impact on non-…nancials. Indeed, the market appears to have been able to segregate non-…nancials according to their credit risk. This increased sensitivity to credit risk for non-…nancial …rms indicates that market events had a heterogeneous impact on non-…nancial …rms. While low credit quality …rms experienced increased spreads, high credit quality …rms continued to receive short-term funding.
E¤ectively, the runs that occurred in the repo markets (Gorton and Metrick (2009) and many others) and the ABCP markets (Covitz, Liang and Suarez (2009)) were phenomena isolated to …nancials. The maturity mismatch at non-…nancials did not lead to funding withdrawals, at least for the highest quality …rms. In order to further check this interpretation of the results, we will run a robustness check only looking at A1/P1 issuers (see results below).
The Role of Dealers
One heightened concern during the crisis was the …nancial condition of intermediating banks. Indeed, this connection is the basis for concern that a …nancial sector shock impacts the real economy.
Without …nancial intermediaries, a real-economy …rm may be unable to obtain funds for otherwise pro…table investments.
A …rm that issued its commercial paper through a dealer could potentially be perceived as being more dependent on …nancial institutions for funding and thus at greater risk during times of …nancial market distress. We test whether the market used this distinction in penalizing the funding costs of dealer-dependent …rms.
A typical relationship involves the issuer placing its commercial paper through a dealer. The dealer will typically buy the paper at a discount and immediately sell it in the market. On occasion, dealers will hold some paper inventory as a service to issuers; this is often useful when issuers need funds of a particular maturity. During the crisis, if a dealer's own access to liquidity shrunk, their ability to o¤er services would shrink as well. As a result, one might expect that issuers that were dependent on dealers would have been more susceptible to the liquidity shocks we observed above.
We expand on equations 1 and 2 above by estimating the speci…cations on the subsamples de…ned according to whether the CP programs had a dealer or not. We subdivide the sample into the 100% dealer placement and <100% in order to highlight the fact that …rms with proportions less than 100% do not have fully independent access to …nancial markets and are thus potentially exposed to intermediation channel disruptions. Table 5 shows a couple of di¤erences between …rms that had 100% dealer placement and those that did not. During the …rst and second crisis events (August 2007 and March 2008) …rms that had less than 100% dealer placement saw no liquidity shock, but these …rms su¤ered an increased sensitivity to credit risk. These results suggest that issuers that use a dealer are more subject to liquidity risk than those that do not. This highlights the role of …nancial intermediaries in transmitting the initial liquidity shock to other …nancial markets. Even though the commercial paper market is thought as arm's length …nancing without …nancial intermediation, it is clear from these results that …nancial intermediaries act as dealers in many of these transactions, and, therefore, there is some risk of spillover of their liquidity problems to this market.
[Insert T able 5 here]
However, during the Lehman event, we observe the opposite pattern: liquidity risk is signi…cant while credit risk is not for …rms that had less than 100% dealer placement. We attribute this result to the fact that the Lehman event was characterized by widespread liquidity problems. In this event, all …rms, regardless of their use of a dealer, experience an increased liquidity premium. We will see further evidence to support this pattern below when we further subdivide the sample into low and high credit quality issuers.
Firms that were 100% dealer intermediated saw a large credit and liquidity e¤ect in the three events. This is consistent with the idea that …rms without their own programs were in greater need of intermediation services. Naturally, the presence of intermediation services leads logically to a stronger transmission mechanism from the …nancial to the real economy.
Credit Quality
To gain further insight into the patterns we observe, we continue by restricting our sample to the set of issuers who programs have the highest ratings (A1/P1 ratings). 10 For these regressions, we …nd programs that have an A1/P1 rating at the beginning of each of the three sample periods.
While we restrict the sample by credit quality, the data contain signi…cant cross-sectional variation 1 0 Rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 limits the credit risk that money market mutual funds may bear by restricting their investments to "eligible" securities. An eligible security must carry one of the two highest ratings ("1" or "2") for short-term obligations from at least two of the nationally recognized statistical ratings agencies. A tier-1 security is an eligible security rated "1" by at least two of the rating agencies; a tier-2 security is an eligible security that is not a tier-1 security.
in CDS spreads even within the high-quality issuers. This variation allows us to draw inference within this sample.
In table 6 we present the results for …nancials and non-…nancials and in table 7 the results for the dealer and non-dealer programs.
[Insert T ables 6 and 7 here]
In table 6 we …nd qualitatively similar results to table 4; however, most of the coe¢ cients are smaller in magnitude. Note that these regressions include only the highest quality programs, and, therefore, the credit risk is less severe in this sample. Nonetheless, we see that changes in risk are internalized by the market and impact issuer spreads. We take this as evidence that the market was able to distinguish the credit quality di¤erences among the highest quality issuers, even in the midst of signi…cant market turmoil. With the crisis events, the credit risk premium increased for low quality non-…nancial …rms, but to a lesser extent for the highest quality …rms.
In table 7 we observe that 100% dealer intermediated A1/P1 saw no liquidity shock in any of the three stages of the crisis. This result is particularly salient. The highest quality issuers, even those that had intermediation services exclusively by dealer, did not experience liquidity e¤ects at any point during the crisis.
These contrast with the results in table 5 in which liquidity was signi…cant for all three events for the dealer programs. By restricting the sample to the highest quality programs, we …nd that the market demanded a higher liquidity premium only for the lowest quality programs and only if they were dealer intermediated. We also observe that the coe¢ cients on the credit risk and liquidity risk during the three market events are smaller in table 7 than in table 5, suggesting that the increased credit and liquidity premiums in the crisis were smaller for the highest quality programs than the lower quality programs.
Our intuition from this …nding is that the liquidity shocks that occurred throughout the crisis emerged in part from credit quality concerns. Thus, even though we are able to separate out liquidity and credit components from spreads, the core reason for the presence of a liquidity premium indeed lies in credit.
Conclusions
This paper provides empirical evidence of the relative contributions of credit risk and liquidity risk in the widening of unsecured commercial paper spreads of maturity 1 to 4 days during three major events in the 2007-2008 …nancial crisis. Our …ndings are nuanced in that we …nd that initial …nancial sector shocks had little impact on corporate issuers and that the Lehman event passed through the dealer channel to struggling …rms. These …ndings suggest a deeper and more complex set of relationships between the …nancial sector and the real economy.
Indeed, our conclusion is that the real economy is highly resilient, but not impervious, to …nancial sector distress. Non-…nancial …rms managed to withstand even the large shocks faced by …nancial …rms in the …rst year of the crisis, shocks that, at the time, were being described as
unprecedented. Had the crisis ended earlier, our paper could have concluded that there are little or no transmission e¤ects, even for the largest shocks. With hindsight, and the presence of the enormous Lehman shock, we see that the transmission e¤ect to the real economy indeed exists.
However, it appears to manifest only under the most extreme events and along certain channels.
This nonlinearity lends credence to the story that the disintermediation of banks and …nancial companies has supported the ability of non-…nancial …rms to succeed. This nonlinearity exists due to the presence of low credit quality …rms. That is, the liquidity shocks that impacted the real economy did so on the margin of impacting lower quality …rms'borrowing rates. In the end, there appears to have been little risk to the cost of funds of high credit quality …rms.
While this study has found detailed evidence of the transmission channel of the …nancial sector, we do not explore some dimensions of this question. Our study looks at the cost of funding of commercial paper issuers, conditional on their participation in the market. We encourage future study in the determinants of market participation and the potential impact of the …nancial sector on those decisions. Note: Credit risk is defined as the CDS spread of the issuer. Liquidity risk is defined as the fraction of paper maturing over the next week. All variables are in percent. 
